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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In this brief the Appellant presents the following issues 
for review: 
1. Does Respondent's failure to summon a named party 
prior to trial or entry of judgment against a co-defendant, 
compel Respondent to proceed against Appellant by Order to Show 
Cause under Rule 71B(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
2. Does entry of a "judgment by default" have the 
same procedural effect as a "trial" as that terra is used in Rule 
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
DETERMINATIVE CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
Interpretation of the following cases, rules of civil 
procedure and official references are determinative of the issues 
raised in this brief: 
Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Company, 76 P.2d 234 (Utah 1938); 
McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 129 (Utah 
1966); 
Watson v. State, 694 P.2d 560 (Oregon 1985); 
Section 104-3-17 Revised Statutes of Utah (1933); 
Section 104-5-17 Revised Statutes of Utah (1933); 
Section 104-31-1 Revised Statutes of Utah (1933); 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
Rule 71B(a) - (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This is an appeal as of right wherein Appellant seeks 
review of a Memorandum Decision entered by the Fifth Circuit 
Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, Murray Department. 
The Memorandum Decision of the court below was dated and entered 
July 21, 1989. [R. 79] 
This is a case of first impression before the Court of 
Appeals, calling for an interpretation of Rule 7IB of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as pertaining to the procedure 
necessary to commence an action against a person jointly indebted 
upon an obligation, where such joint obligor was not originally 
served with process prior to judgment being taken against a co-
defendant/co-obligor who had been served with process and duly 
defaulted. 
The underlying civil action was filed on the 22nd day 
of November 1985, by Commercial Security Bank, now known as Key 
Bank, naming Martin Parcell and Stephanie Johnson as parties 
Defendant. [R. 1-3] On the 26th day of November 1985, Defendant 
Martin Parcell was joined as a party when he was served with a 
summons and complaint. [R. 4] Stephanie Parcell was not summoned 
until several years after a judgment by default had been entered 
against her former spouse/co-defendant. [R. 13] 
The basis of Respondent's claim against Appellant is a 
joint credit card obligation allegedly owed by Appellant and her 
former husband, Martin Parcell. [R. 79] 
On the 13th day of January 1986, Default judgment was 
entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Martin 
Parcell. [R. 13] On October 13, 1988, Defendant Stephanie 
Johnson was for the first time served with the Summons and 
original Complaint in this matter. [R. 51] 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. Appellant was named as a co-defendant with her 
former husband, Martin M. Parcell (hereinafter "Parcell") in a 
lawsuit filed against them by Commercial Security Bank on or 
about November 20, 1985. [R. 1-3] 
2. Summons was duly served on Parcell, but not on 
Appellant. [R. 4] 
3. Judgment was recovered against Parcell, as a 
person jointly indebted upon an obligation, but not against 
Appellant. [R. 13] The judgment against Parcell was taken by 
default and duly entered on January 13, 1986. [R. 13] 
4. Appellant was not served, nor did she otherwise 
receive notice of the original action, until she received 
personal service of summons and a copy of the original complaint 
on October 13, 1988, nearly three years after judgment had been 
entered against Parcell, who had by then left the jurisdiction. 
[R. 51] 
5. On April 18, 1989, the court below heard oral 
arguments on Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. Memoranda in support 
of, and in opposition to, appellant's Motion to Dismiss were 
submitted by counsel. [R. 57-67] 
6. On July 21, 1989, the court below denied 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss finding in pertinent part that 
"Rule 7 IB of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is not an 
exclusive remedy for Plaintiff to pursue against Defendant 
Johnson, [and that] Plaintiff may elect to proceed either under 
Rule 4(b) or 71B of URCP." [R. 79] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Rules 4(b) and 7 IB of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are mutually exclusive remedies or procedures in that 
Rule 4(b) governs the timing of service of summons prior to trial 
and Rule 7IB sets forth the procedure for binding a judgment 
against a party not originally served, but jointly obligated on a 
debt. 
II. Entry of a "Judgment by Default" has the same 
procedural effect as a "Trial" as that term is used in Rule 4(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, if plaintiff fails to 
summon a co-defendant prior to entry of a default judgment 
against another co-defendant, plaintiff is precluded from 
proceeding under Rule 4(b) and if plaintiff is to proceed against 
the defendant not summoned, he must do so under Rule 71B(b). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
RULES 4(b) AND 71B OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDIES/PROCEDURES AND THE COURT BELOW ERRED 
IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF-BANK MAY ELECT TO 
PROCEED AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HEREIN 
UNDER EITHER RULE 4(b) OR RULE 7IB. 
Both Rule 4(b) and Rule 72B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide for bringing a defendant before the Court in 
situations wherein multiple defendants are involved. More 
specifically, the aforementioned Rules of Civil Procedure set 
forth in pertinent part, as follows: 
RULE 4(b) 
.... The summons must be served within one 
year after the filing of the complaint or the 
action will be deemed dismissed, provided 
that in any action brought against two or 
more Defendant's in which personal service 
has been obtained upon one of them within a 
year the others may be served or appear at 
any time before trial. 
RULE 71B 
(a) .... Where the action is against two or 
more defendants and the summons is served on 
one or more, but not all of them, the 
plaintiff may proceed against the defendants 
served in the same manner as if they were the 
only defendants. 
(b) .... When a judgment has been recovered 
against one or more, but not all, of several 
persons jointly indebted upon an obligation, 
the Plaintiff may require any person not 
originally served with the summons to appear 
and show cause why he should not be bound by 
the judgment in the same manner as though he 
had been originally served with process. 
(c) . ... Plaintiff shall issue a summons, 
describing the judgment, and requiring the 
defendant to appear within the time required 
for appearance in response to an original 
summons, and show cause why he should not be 
bound by such judgment..., 
(d) .•.. The pleadings shall consist of 
plaintiff's affidavit, , , a copy of the 
original Complaint and Judgment sha 1 1 be 
included. 
Accordingly, while both of the above cited rules provide a 
mechanism for serving process upon a co-defendant and/or haling 
h nit • are mutual ] y excl 1 isive. That is, Rule 
4(b) is to be utilized to bring a party before the court "at any 
time before trial," whereas Rule 71B is to be utilized after a 
trial or "[w]hen a judgment has been recover ed against one . . . 
but not all < r several persons jointly indebted upon an 
obligation . . ." Thus, the respective rules are to be used at 
different times, depending upon what has transpired in -any 
particular cause of action. The extent to which a proceeding has 
progressed dictate* wn *. •:• of the rules is the appropriate 
mechanism for haling a defendant into court. 
the instant case it is clear that plaintiff-Bank has not 
<*.les of civil Procedure in its 
action against defendant Stephanie Johnson. Simply pi it, for 
plaintiff to properly proceed against co-defendant Stephanie 
Johnson .in this nidi i *i , piaintiit must starve defendant pursuant 
to Rule 7IB, This is so for two reasons. First, pursuant to 
Rule 4(b), because the instant action was brought against two 
defendants and personal service has been obtained only ; ipoi I one 
of them (appellant's former husband), "the other may be served or 
appear at any time before trial (emphasis added). Since a 
default judgment has been entered against a co-defendant 
(appellants husband), this plaintiff is foreclosed from utilizing 
Rule 4(b) at this juncture. This is because a default judgment 
has the same procedural effect as a "trial,M as that term is used 
in Rule 4(b). See, argument at Point II, infra. Thus, if Rule 
4(b) is to be used, it must be implemented prior to trial or 
judgment. Second, pursuant to the express provisions of Rule 
71B, if a plaintiff wishes to pursue an action against a joint 
obligor in a situation wherein a judgment has already been 
recovered against a person jointly obligated, he must proceed—if 
at all—in accordance with the provisions of Rule 7IB. 
A review of the Collateral References to Rule 7IB gives the 
correct and consistent interpretation of Rule 7IB. Section 270 
of 59 Am Jur 2d, Parties, as cited under Rule 71B, states the 
following: 
When, however, the Plaintiff neglects to join 
a necessary or indispensable party Defendant 
or all those who are liable upon the cause of 
action sued upon, particularly where that 
liability is joint, the Defendant sued has a 
valid ground for objection for which he or 
she should be permitted to obtain relief. 
This objection is very generally regarded as 
of dilatory nature to be presented promptly 
and in the method prescribed by local 
practice. 59 Am Jur 2d, Section 270, page 
804. 
This reference clearly shows that the entire purpose of Rule 
7IB is to compel plaintiff to proceed in a manner which permits 
the defendant to promptly in a non-dilatory manner come before 
the court and show why the defendant was an indispensable or 
necessa i •• :on on the joint obligation and should 
have been joined prior • > the time judgment was taken against the 
other defendant. .-- language of Rul e 71 B does not allow 
• -^  r?>* t .o proceed i inder either Rule 7IB 
- governs the form of the pleadings, 
requiring Summons * - Appear and Show Cause, Affidavit of 
r: I g i n a ] C o; ' •; •* */ h e r e a s 1: h e 
reference - . .> i^ merely to show thar_ plaintiff can 
serv- a Summons ar i Affidavit upon a co-defendant any - Lme 
p r i o ~ -^  . • * h.,t * : * " • " J 
proceed at it must proceed in compliance with Rule 7IB. 
It is noteworthy that the substance of 7IB has been a part 
of Utah law for a very protracted period of time. As earl} as 
1933 the substance of Rule 7] R was a part. ->: the Revised Statutes 
of Utah. Section 104-31 ] of the 1933 Revised Statute of Utah 
set forth as follows: 
104-31-1. J oint Debtors Not Served to Show 
Cause Why They Should Not Be Bound by 
Judgment. 
When a judgment is recovered against one or 
more of several persons jointly indebted upon 
an obligation, by a proceeding as provided in 
section • 104-5-17, those who were not 
originally served with the summons and did 
not appear in the action may be summoned to 
show cause why they should not be bound by 
the judgment in the same manner as if they 
had been originally served with the summons. 
(C.L. 17, Sect- 6874.) 
"T h i i s
 r ci) ii e :i s c omp e 11 e d t o a s k 11: I e qu e s 11 o n, '" rt h y wa s S e c t i o n 
104-31-1 enacted as law and retained as a rule of civil procedure 
(Rule 71B) if a party plaintiff could accomplish the same result 
under Rule 4(b)?M Again, the purpose of Section 104-31-1, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 and Rule 71B is to compel 
plaintiff to proceed against a defendant/joint obligor in a 
manner allowing such defendant to promptly and in a non-dilatory 
manner show cause why she should not be bound by the judgment 
rendered against the co-obligor (plaintiff's husband). Because 
plaintiff did not proceed pursuant to Rule 7IB in a non-dilatory 
fashion, reversible error was committed and the Memorandum 
Decision issued by the Court below should be reversed. 
The only Utah case appellants are aware of concerning Rule 
71B and/or Section 104-31-1, Revised Statutes of Utah (1933) is 
Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Company, 76 P.2d 234 (Utah 1938). 
Hoyt clearly supports appellants position that, in the instant 
case, plaintiff must proceed against appellants—if at all—in 
accordance with Rule 7IB. The Supreme Court of Utah set forth 
the following: 
In this case it is true that had there been 
no security Hoyt could have obtained judgment 
against the Lemons, the endorsers, without 
summoning the makers or could have later 
pursued the makers. This results from 
fitting together sections 104-5-17, 104-31-1, 
104-3-17, R.S. 1933. 
76 P.2d at 239. 
Thus, the clear implication from the aforementioned language 
is that if plaintiff desires to pursue a co-defendant who was not 
an indespensable party, the appropriate procedure would be the 
utilization of Sections 104-31-1, and 104-5-17, R.S. 1933. 
Similarly, in the instant action, if plaintiff Bank wishes to 
action against appellant herein, it must do so in 
!h Rule /IB ot the Utah Rules ut Civil Procedure 
POINT TWO 
ENTRY OF A "JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT" HAS THE SAME 
PROCEDURAL EFFECT AS A "TRIAL" AS THAT TERM 
IS USED IN RULE 4(b), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, AND THEREFORE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE 
TO SERVE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO ENTRY OF THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT PRECLUDES PLAINTIFF FROM 
PROCEEDING UNDER RULE 4(b). 
As set forth, i n Point One hereinabove . - .-=:;*•:• -o 
hale a co-defendant into Court pursuant to Rule 4(b), he must 
serve pi ocess upon said co-defendant prior tu vi±a Inasmuch as 
appellant (co-defendant) herein was not served pi: io i : t .< > t .he 
default judgment being entered, plaintiff must necessarily 
--1 < .; j '•"•-^.n:- * ile 71B. The reason for 
this that iefault judgment tantamount to a judgment 
entered after trial. 
1 7 Ameri can J i irispr udence 2nd! Judgments , Sect I on 1193 
supports the position that a judgment by default is tantamount 
to, and has the same effect as a judgment rendered after a trial 
on the raei* its . 
The circumstance that the defendant let the 
matter go uncontested to judgment does not 
impair the effect of a judgment by default, 
which is ordinarily accorded similar effect, 
and is as much a verity, as a judgment 
rendered in a contested proceeding. Although 
it has been declared that such a judgment may 
be regarded as a conditional judgment, 
especially where a rule of court for opening 
or striking off the same, the general rule is 
that even where a party has the right to have 
a judgment by default set aside, such 
judgment must, until set aside, be regarded 
as a subsisting and regular judgment. 
pursue 
compl la 
Further, see McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 
P.2d 129 (Utah 1966) wherein the Utah Supreme Court iterated the 
following: 
The purpose of a default judgment is to 
conclude litigation when defendant fails to 
plead or otherwise defend an action. 
411 P.2d at 130. 
See also Watson v. State, 694 P.2d 560 (Oregon 1985) 
wherein it was set forth as follows: 
Judgments entered after default . . . have 
the same solemn character as judgments 
entered after trial. 
694 P.2d at 562. 
Accordingly, a default judgment has the same purpose and 
effect as does a trial on the merits—to wit—to conclude the 
litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated hereinabove, the Memorandum Decision 
of the court below should be reversed and remanded with 
instructions that plaintiff must proceed against Appellant in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 7IB if it is to proceed at 
all. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 1990. 
MOORE, MCDONOUGH & NORTON 
ROBERT G.&ORTON 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed => f,-ue and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage fully 
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Stephanie Johnson 
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Bryan W. Cannon, Esq. 
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ADDENDUM 
Excerpts from the Record 
as cited in Appellant's Brief 
BRYAN W. CANNON 
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
306 Prowswood Plaza 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone (801) 263-3344 
V?s Kr/22 p,.., 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF TTT'fiHr 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
* * * * * * * 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
A B a n k i n g C o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
MARTIN M. PARCELL and 
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
t * h ( [ * * 
Plaintiff complains of Defendants and for cause of 
action alleges as follows: 
1. The damages claimed in this action are less than 
$10,000,»HJ
 r exclusive of costs. 
2. Plaintiff is a banking corporation authorized to do 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
3. Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a -ontract 
puisudnt to uliii 1 ! lie Plaintiff agreed tn extend credit to 
Defendants on an open account through the use of a Commercial 
15 
Security Bank Master Charge Account under Account No. 5413-7543-
5020 -* • 
A
 Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiff al ] amount s 
charged by Defendants on said Master Charge Account, together 
with itjtPr^ Fi it ih<- J i\tv ni i wont y -one percent (21%) per annum 
until paid. 
5 Plaintiff has* fulfilled al 1 of i ts obligations 
pursuant tc sa :i d contract bi it Defendants have defaulted on said 
contract in that they have failed and refused and to continue to 
fail and refuse to pay the amounts due and owing by them. 
• '•' ' • -dants tiie Plain-
tiff has been damaged in the LUES ^i 03,560.46, together with 
interest at the rate of twenty-one percent (21%) per annum from 
and after September 6, 1983. 
7 Pursuant to said contract the Defendants agreed 
that in the event of collection by legal process said Defendants 
would pay costs and reasonable attorney's fees jncurjod by the 
Plaintiff. As a result thereof, Plaintiff is entitled to such 
reasonable attorney's fees as this Court deems proper. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays Judgment agaii is .t Defendants 
as follows: 
1. For Judgment against Defendants, jointly and 
severally, in the sum of $3,560.46, together with interest 
thereon accruing at the rate of twenty-one percent (21%) per 
annum from the 6th day' of September, 1983, and for a reasonable 
attorney's fee as determined by the Court. 
-2-
laintiff's costs incurred hereii 1. 
—
u
 other and further relief as the Court 
deems just and proper in the premises 
DATED til i s del) o 1' Mi >vo.ml><:.' r , 1 H H 5 . 
•6/U'/L^^-
BRYAN W. CANNON 
PQOljk, CANNON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
P. 0. Box 27445 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
BRYAN W. CANNON 
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
306 Prowswood Plaza 
4885 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone (801) 263-3344 , 
-4 p?:] 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COUNT STATU OK UTAH 
SALT L A K i S S ^ T Y , MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
A B a n k i n g C o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i 11 t i f f
 # 
v s . 
JJARTTN M, PARCEL!/ and 
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL, 
Defendants, 
SUMMONS 
Civil No. ^SiCMLzSOCei 
* * * ' I: I • i • • * 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT MARTIN M. PARCELL: 
You are hereby summoned and
 regUired to file an answer 
in writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the above 
entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to BRYAN W. CANNON, 
Plaintiff's attorney, 306 Prowswood Plaza, 4885 South 900 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, a copy of said answer within 20 days 
after the service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has 
been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is 
hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
^ATE «2a W&* f November 985, 
7gl? 1-2CQC.O 
RflAY PRECIS! COUNTY, UTAH 
^//jT/^h? • . DEPUTY. 7 
Serve D/6f^nda#t At : 
854 E a s t M a r i o n V i l l a g e Road 
Sandy, Utah 
OR POB: Colletts Home Furnishings 
75 East 7200 South 
Midvale, Utah 
W. CAN! 
VObyk, CANNON & SMITH 
A*£fe6rneys for Plaintiff 
Vbc I. 7,0" 
A 
1^ . KtlJt.. 
At-t-orfioyti t o i P l u i t ^ i i i 
4885 Sou th 900 E a s t , S u i t e 30o 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 
Jy 
°t£, *K X?& 
2£3-3344 Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKECOUN 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
a Banking Corporation, 
MARTIN M. PARCELL and 
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL, 
vtURRAY DEPARTMENT 
) 
) 
) 
¥S. 
Plaintiff 
Defendant(s) 
DEFAULT 
\ND DEFAULT 
JI JDGMENT 
Civil No,, 
DEFAULT 
In this action, defendant(s) MARTIN M. PARCELL having been 
regularly served with summons and complaint, and having failed to appear and answer plaintiff's complaint, 
and the time allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of said defendants) is hereby entered ac-
cording to law 
Dated J-&*' / -> ' &U Clerk oft tie Circuit. 
Deputy Clerk-- " ^ ^ 
Tias-failed to plead 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Thedcfendant(s) MARTIN M. PARCELL 
or otherwise defend in this action and default has been entered. 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK be awarded 
judgment against said dcfendant(s) in the amount of: 
3,560.46 Principal, 
Accrued interest to date of judgment. 
Accrued costs to date of judgment, 
Attorney's fees, and 
TOTAL JUDGMENT, 
with interest on the total judgment at]_2 % per annum as provided by law from thedate of this judgment until 
paid, plus after-accruing costs. 
% 
s 
% 
$ 
1,742.50 
36.25 
700.00 
6,039.21 
jt-crc^ ntrMy-* for Plaintiff 
40 East South Temple, #3 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100gg \Vj\0i\y^^ :08 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE. COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
a Banking Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARTIN M. PARCELL and 
STEPHANIE H. JOHNSON fka 
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL, 
Defendants. 
SUMMONS 
Civil No. 85-CVM-8061 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT STEPHANIE H. 
JOHNSON: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in 
writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the above 
entitled Court, and to serve upon, or mail to Bryan W. Cannon 
Plaintifffs attorney, at 40 East South Temple, #310, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, a copy of said answer within twenty (20) days 
after the service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has 
been filed with the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which is 
hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of October, 1988. 
.s? 
-SZ J/^'C/lc, 
-y7C'*u4,{l' *~Lac*t^ 
Serve Defendant At: 
1837 North 300 West 
Mapleton, Utah 
BRYAN W. CANNON 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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BRYAN W. CANNON 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f s 
40 Eas t South Temple, ^ 0 JAN 23 A7 50 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
CIRCDITGsetJRT, STATE OF UTAH 
UNTY, SALT LAKE-: 
FILED 
SALT LAKE CO OT DEPARTMENT 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
a Banking Corporation, 
P ] a i nt i f ff.( 
vs, 
MARTIN M. PARCELL and 
STEPHANIE H. JOHNSON fka 
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL, 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No. 85-CVM-8061 
I I'M the Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank nka 
Key Bank, by and through its attorney, Bryan w C a n n o n , -:ifi«i 
hereby submit the following Memorandum JH Opposition to the 
Motion of Dismissa Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above entitled action was filed on the 22nd 
Day i • S'I bj Commercial Security Bank now known as 
Key Bank vs. Martin M. Parcel end Stephanie H. Parcel!. 
2. u:, • :• ;oUi aa1. • -•:.-•* . • Defendant 
Martin Par - .-ed WTI.I :.IK- Summons and Complaint. 
Stephanie J Parcel: * ;: :;• • served because Plaintiff did not 
know of her whereabouts. 
1 
21 
3. on «.. » ~ « * ° D e f e n a a n t, Martm 
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 n. Parcell has never been dismissed '"» 
4 • 
«,. said legal action. ^ ^ 
Tn October of 1988, 
ie H Parcell, ana 
hereabouts o. l»t«nd.n> Stephan ^ ^
 o e f e n d a n t w a s 
carried name, Stephanie •
 o f o o t o b e r, 
served with the summons and Co.pla.nt th. -
1988 • 
• *.« permitted to pursue Judgment on a 
I s t h e Plaintiff permx ^ 
•
 =<- i person not originally 
joint obligation agains. . . ^ ^ ^ ^ o t h e r 
summons «hen Judgment has 
joint o , TO QOISIIOfi 
^
m J I 1 1 £
-
m S S m
^ ^ T Z s W of the Utah 
. -^ /i -Rule 71BIDJ ^x 
,,iW/4W6) and (/) a n a Eules 12(b) 4, ) ^ ^ ^ ^ e x p r e s s l y 
Procedure do no-c r« 
oerson not originally served . 
permit the requiring should 
• 4- • appear and show cause wny 
Simons and Complaint P* .
 o u q h they 
n o t b e bound W the Judgment in ^ sa ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
• • ,nv rprvftd with process, 
have been originally -.- - indebted upon the 
*
 artainst a person jointly 
h a s been recovered against 
obligation. 
6S 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant, Stephanie »* Johnsoi K-t Stephanie H, 
Parcell (Johnson) - However, 
the Motion was not accompanied by Memorandum Points and 
Authorities to support the Motion A mere reference is made to 
Rule 12B and Rul< Procedure. 
Nothing in those rules supports Johnson's position, Defendants 
merely st-nt r that these provision uf tiie Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure justify dismissing 1 In Uinum* M; . ar i i^ onif lau'.1 " n the 
grounds that Plaintiff, having taken a Judgment against 
Defendant
 r Mar ti n Parcel] , on an alleged joint obligation prior 
to joining Defendant, Stephanie H lolmMm, i,, reqin rod to 
proceed in accordance with Rule 7 IB Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure " llnwover Yin I r\ 70 (b) reads as follows: 
"When a Judgment has been recovered against 
one or more, but not all, of several persons 
jointly indebted upon an obligation, the 
plaintiff may require any person not 
originally served with the Summons to appear 
and show cause why he should not be bound by 
the Judgment in the same manner as though he 
had been originally served with the process•" 
In this case the case was originally styled, Commercial 
Security Bank vs. Martin M and Stephanie H. Parcell. Stephanie 
was i ic » t ] ater j oined in the action but was a party from the 
outset. Under the above stated rule, the Plaintiff it, entitled 
to require Johnson to appear and show cause why she should not be 
bound by a Judg inei it as i thoi lgh she had been originally served with 
5°! 
23 
process prior to the u -- rn Judgment was 1 a ken against Martin 
r'arcell, There is nothing in Rule 12B or Rule 7IB which supports 
the position of Defendant, Johnson. The Plaintiff, having taken 
a Judgment against Mart; in Pat coll if. ullnwiil t.n proceed on the 
uncoJ lectenl judgment against the joint obligor, Johnson. 
7t& 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .._Zc^_. daY o f • l a n u a j y 
1989 . 
^l / /// (ft 
BRYAN/W. CANNON 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I . hereby declare that 1 caur,o<l in h i W'u .1 true 
and corrt • oi 1 In• foregoing Memorandum, postage prepaid 
this / / day of January, 1989 to the following: 
Robert G. Norton, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant, Johnson 
275 East 2nd South, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
XJ2 
& 
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ROBERT G. NORTON (USB #51 i#) : 
Attorney for Defendant 
275 East 2nd South, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 359-8400 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
a Banking Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARTIN M. PARCELL and 
STEPHANIE H. JOHNSON, fka 
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Civil No. 85-CVM-8061 
DEFENDANT Stephanie H. Johnson, fka Stephanie H. 
Parcell, submits the following memorandum in support of her 
motion to dismiss and in reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
opposition to Motion to dismiss: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The above entitled action was filed on the 22nd 
day of November 1985, by Commercial Security Bank now known as 
Key Bank, naming Martin Parcell and Stephanie Johnson as parties 
of Defendant. 
2. On the 26th day of November 1985, Defendant Martin 
Parcell was joined as a party when he was served with a summons 
and complaint. Stephanie Parcell was not joined as a party 
because she was not served with process and not properly brought 
before this court. 
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3. The basis of Plaintiff's claims against these 
Defendant's is a joint credit card obligation. 
4. On the 13th day of January 1986, Default judgment 
was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Martin 
Parcell. 
5. On October 13, 1988, Defendant Stephanie Johnson 
was served with the Summons and original Complaint in this 
matter. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Contrary to the statement in Plaintiff's Memorandum, 
the question presented is: Has the Plaintiff properly complied 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in proceeding on it's 
claim against joint obligor Stephanie Johnson when she was not 
originally joined as a party until after a judgment was obtained 
against joint obligator Martin Parcell? 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION 
Rule 7IB of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, 
reads as follows: 
(b) .••• When a judgment has been recovered 
against one or more, but not all, of several 
persons jointly indebted upon an obligation, 
the Plaintiff may require any person not 
originally served with the summons to appear 
and show cause why he should not be bound by 
the judgment in the same manner as though had 
been originally served with process 
(c) ..•• Plaintiff shall issue a summons, 
describing the judgmentf and requiring the 
defendant to appear within the time required 
for appearance in response to an original 
summons, and show cause why he should not be 
bound by such judgment... • 
(d) .... The pleadings shall consist of 
plaintiff's affidavit, .... a copy of the 
original Complaint and Judgment shall be 
included. 
There are no Utah cases interpreting this Rule and 
there is no comparable Federal Rule. The Compilers Notes, Cross 
References and Collateral References found under Rule 7IB, refer 
the reader to Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
several sections contained in Am Jur 2d and to Corpus Juris 
Secundum (CJS) under the heading Parties. A thorough review of 
these references brings to light the purpose of Rule 71B and it's 
applicability in this situation. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in pertinent part: 
.... provided that in any action brought 
against two or more Defendant's in which 
personal service has been obtained upon one 
of them within a year the others may be 
served or appear at any time before trial. 
At first impression, this Rule would appear to allow 
Plaintiff to proceed against Stephanie Johnson in the manner in 
which it has, i.e., by simply serving her the original Summons 
and Complaint. However, upon further examination this seems 
illogical because it renders Rule 7 IB meaningless. One is 
compelled to ask the question "Why was 7IB drafted when a party 
Plaintiff could do the same thing under Rule 4(b)?" 
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An answer that immediately comes to mind is that the 
permissive language of 7IB allows a party plaintiff to proceed 
under summons and complaint under Rule 4(b), or by the more 
expedient Order to Show Cause under Rule 71B, requiring defendant 
to show cause whey he or she should not be bound by the former 
judgment entered. 
Again, upon more thorough examination of the history of 
this rule, this explanation becomes illogical because it would 
be inconsistent with the principles of res judicata, it does not 
explain why Rule 71B specifically is limited to joint 
obligations, and the provisions allowing a full trial on the 
merits again renders Rule 71B redundant as to Rule 4(b). 
However, a review of the Collateral References gives 
the correct and consistent interpretation of Rule 7IB. Section 
270 of 59 Am Jur 2nd, Parties, as cited under Rule 71B, states 
the following: 
When, however, the Plaintiff neglects to join 
a necessary or indispensable party Defendant 
or all those who are liable upon the cause of 
action sued upon particularly where that 
liability is joint, the Defendant sued has a 
valid ground for objection for which he or 
she should be permitted to obtain relief. 
This objection is very generally regarded as 
of dilatory nature to be presented promptly 
and in the method prescribed by local 
practice. 59 Am Jur 2d, Section 270, page 
804. 
This reference clearly shows that the entire purpose of 
Rule 71B is to compel Plaintiff to proceed in a manner which 
permits the Defendant to promptly in a non-dilatory manner come 
//A 
before the court and show cause why the Defendant was an 
indispensable or necessary party to the action on the joint 
obligation and should have been joined prior to the time judgment 
was taken against the other Defendant. The permissive language 
of Rule 7 IB is not interpreted to allow Plaintiff a choice as to 
whether to proceed under either Rule 71B or Rule 4(b), Rule 71B 
governs the form of the pleadings, requiring a Summons to Appear 
and Show Cause, Affidavit of Plaintiff and copy of original 
Complaint; whereas the reference to 4(b) is made merely to show 
that Plaintiff can serve a Summons and Affidavit in compliance 
with Rule 7IB at any time prior to trial- In short, in this case 
if Plaintiff is to proceed at all, it must proceed in compliance 
with rule 7IB. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case Plaintiff clearly has not complied 
with Rule 71B (c), (d), in that Plaintiff has not served 
Defendant with a Summons to Appear and Show Cause, Affidavit of 
Plaintiff and copy of original Complaint. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff's service of process is insufficient and Plaintiff has 
failed to state a cause of action against Defendant upon which 
relief may be granted, and pursuant to Rules 12B(4) and 12B(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the matter should be dismissed. 
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A \-£i*V DATED this )T day of February, 1989. 
i#U* 
ROBERT G. MORTON 
Attorney ror Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a copy of the 
JJ 
foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM to the following, this JO " day of 
February, 1989. 
Bryan W. Cannon, Esq. 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
40 East South Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
fTfefe-
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
a Banking Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARTIN M. PARCELL and 
STEPHANIE H. JOHNSON, fka 
STEPHANIE H. PARCELL, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 853008061 
Defendant Stephanie M. Johnson's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
The Court finds that Rule 71B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
is not an exclusive remedy for Plaintiff to pursue against Defendant Johnson. 
Rule 71B(a) states that " the Plaintiff may " proceed 
as provided in the rule. The wording is not mandatory. Plaintiff may elect 
to proceed either under Rule 4(b) or 71B of URCP. 
DATED this 21st day of July 1989. 
-fl 
